This article introduces the special issue and identifies three key contributions. First, R2P advocates are right to mark the progress that has been made, but that should not -and generally does not -lead norm diffusers to rest on their laurels or to fall into a complacency that sees moral progress as inevitable. Second, the burden of concrete protection practiceswhether they be reflected in contributions to peacekeeping missions or the granting of asylum -is being unfairly distributed across international society. This hierarchy is potentially destabilising and it demands that the great powers -or those laying claim to that identityrecognise their 'special responsibility to protect'. Third, the great powers do have an important responsibility to reconcile the demands of human protection and international peace and security. It is difficult to reconcile these if we look narrowly at the former in terms of intervention, especially military intervention. Reiterating R2P to remind states that other prudent options are available -such as receiving refugees -is an important step, especially in the current context.
As you undoubtedly know, a number of communications from individuals and non-governmental organisations have been addressed to the Commission on Human Rights and to the Secretary-General which relate to human rights and fundamental freedoms. Some of these allege violations of human rights within specific member states 3 The statement raises the issue of UN responsibilities regarding human rights violations within states. Humphries goes on to explain: But these communications which allege violations of human rights within specific Member States give rise to difficulties of the first magnitude. For while the Secretariat must hand them on to the Commission, the latter does not appear to have any right under the Charter to make recommendation to the States in question in regard to them. The facts and circumstances described in the communications are "matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction" of the Member States, with the result that, under Article 2 (7) of the Charter, all intervention (and even a recommendation might and probably would be considered intervention by the Member State envisaged) by the United Nations is excluded. As I understand the situation, no recommendation can be made with regard to a matter "essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State" unless the recommendation is made by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter, i.e. when the situation constitutes a threat to peace. 4 It seems that since its inception, human rights violations within states have created problems of 'the first magnitude' for the UN. The sanctity of state sovereignty looms large. A 'simple' recommendation by the Commission is viewed as a form of illegal intervention in the domestic jurisdiction of Member States. Only the UN Security Council is deemed to hold such power and this depends on their evaluation of whether an individual crisis constitutes a threat to international peace and security. The statement therefore reinforces the conclusion drawn by the Independent International Commission on Kosovo, 'human rights were given a subordinate and marginalised role in the UN system in 1945'. The UN's involvement in crises such as Cote d'Ivoire, Sudan, South Sudan, Yemen, Mali, Somalia, Syria, the Central African Republic, and Iraq -to name just a few -reveals a United Nations becoming increasingly involved in human protection as part of its core business. Of course, there are differences of opinion, but the underlying point is that progress has been made because at the very least, the RtoP is now in the room. Others such as Aidan Hehir, Robert appropriateness from somewhere else). This can be the cause of some confusion. As a normative aspiration R2P is clear. It articulates a universal standard of appropriate behaviour.
States should protect their populations and, when they are deemed to be 'manifestly failing' to do so, the international community should protect those same populations. Because this is clear, and because it was unanimously adopted by states in 2005, we might say the R2P is fully-fledged as a normative aspiration. As Alex Bellamy notes, 'the key debates now are ones about how best to implement R2P, not about whether to accept the principle itself'.
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The question becomes more complex, however, when we use 'norm' to describe social reality.
From this perspective we can say that R2P is a norm because states are more conscious of their responsibilities to protect populations (their own and others), and because they are aware that if they fail to protect their own populations, other states (or entities like the ICC) might intervene in their internal affairs. Bellamy offers strong evidence that this is clearly the case. The number of United Nations Security Council resolutions reminding states and UN peace operations of their responsibility to protect has increased. 16 States -if not their populations -are more aware of their responsibility to protect. But it seems any description of R2P as a norm (especially a fully-fledged norm) demands more. If we use that term to describe social reality rather than normative aspiration then we are surely using it to describe the fulfilment of the responsibility R2P articulates and states accept.
Several articles in this special issue discuss the evidence that can lead us to talk of R2P as a social norm that influences state behaviour. They go beyond this, however, to also address the implications of that fact. But the special issue kicks off by revisiting the question of R2P
as normative aspiration. This does not mean, we hasten to add, that we disagree with the point Bellamy expresses; the principle that states and international society should protect populations from genocide, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing and war crimes has widespread acceptance. What Adrian Gallagher does question, however, is how much R2P
advocates should actually aspire to achieve. Gallagher argues that the discourse surrounding R2P suffers from overly inflated expectations and this, in turn, provokes criticism, which, despite being misplaced, makes it harder to defend the concept.
An example of this, Gallagher argues, is the criticism that R2P is failing because the international response to mass atrocities remains characterised by inconsistency. that are least capable of doing so. This point has been argued elsewhere and it is taken up in the discussion of the articles by Şeyşane and Çelik, and Morris. 18 Before that, however, the articles in this special issue deal with a related question: what are the normative implications that emerge from the social fact that states recognise R2P; that international society expects states to fulfil their responsibilities; and that failure to do so exposes states to social sanction? There is an assumption in much of the literature that this is a sign of normative progress. This reflects some of the assumptions in the discussion of norms by International Relations constructivists, who tend to equate the institutionalisation of a norm with normative progress. 19 The endpoint of the norm life-cycle is that taken for granted quality and, in getting to that stage, 'norm entrepreneurs' should expose contestation as hypocritical and regressive.
Gregor Hofmann challenges this view of contestation by drawing on a 'reflexivist' constructivist view. Contestation in this sense is not a sign of normative regress; it is in fact intrinsic to the normativity or legitimacy of a norm. Indeed, Hofmann reminds us that R2P
was rescued from irrelevance in 2005 by processes of contestation and adaptation. Indeed, among the compromises negotiated at the World Summit one was the understanding that decisions on coercive force would be taken on a case-by-case basis. Moreover, Hofmann makes explicit the point that R2P could only develop as a norm because it was seen to have 'taken the arguments of opponents seriously'. This is important. It alerts us to fact that R2P
is the product of an imperfect world, which goes back to Gallagher's point that we should not expect perfection; nor should we, to repeat Alex Bellamy's words, 'let the perfect become the enemy of the good'. implication is E. H. Carr-like: the sustainability of the moral progress embodied in R2P requires engagement with, and possible accommodation of, its critics. 22 Some might argue that this kind of accommodation may well lead us to the same attenuated version of R2P that Garwood-Gowers describes as 'unbalanced'. But this is not necessarily the case. Critics in Brazil and China have floated ideas -such as Responsibility while Protecting (RwP) and Responsible Protection (RP) -that stress the importance of procedural checks and balances that can hold the powerful states to account for the manner in which they implement international society's Pillar III mandate. Moreover, because these ideas reflect a concern among the emerging powers that they reject the 'norm-taker / norm-maker' hierarchy implicit in conventional constructivist accounts of norm diffusion -their post-colonial identity demands they be seen as norm-shapers -it suggests a post-Western world is not necessarily a post-interventions world.
23 Indeed Garwood-Gowers poses the intriguing possibility the China will become pro-interventionist as it develops global interests. Of course, this could pose as many problems for R2P as it solves, but the point remains: those at the top of the hierarchy of states need to be held accountable for the manner in which they implement R2P.
The possibility that the 'nom-taker / norm-maker' hierarchy underpins the positions of two states that have contested what it means to implement R2P -Brazil and South Africa -is discussed by Kenkel and de Rosa, and Malte Brosig and Nathalie Zahringer respectively. Drawing on Amitav Acharya's concepts of norm localization and norm subsidiarity, Kenkel and de Rosa, argue that Brazil's RwP initiative can be interpreted as an attempt to breakdown this hierarchy by pitching an idea that is very much of, and in some ways for, the Global identity. Brazil has a third identity, that of 'an emerging power' and this is significant in understanding the development of RwP.
Brazil's emerging power identity is almost exclusively a factor of its position in the international distribution of material power. However, Kenkel and de Rosa argue that by proposing amendments to the manner in which a global norm like R2P is implemented, Brazil was putting the ideational gloss on this new identity. Emerging powers are normshapers and to consolidate that identity Brazil had to be seen to influencing the direction of global norms. RwP was as much about 'middle powership' than it was about R2P. This is an important insight and it illustrates how the emergence of new powers like Brazil and China is not necessarily threat to R2P. Indeed, it can be argued -following Kenkel and de Rosa -that
R2P is defining what it means to be an emerging power. To be seen as powerful, a state has to engage with R2P and fulfil its special responsibilities. It is also important, however, to
properly understand the implications of this insight, for there is a danger that by locating RwP in the specific circumstances of Brazilian history and its geopolitical position, Brazil's contribution to the development of a global consensus on Pillar III is dismissed. As the other contributions to the special issue suggest, RwP has merit for addressing the concern that R2P is an expression and reinforcement of a hierarchy of states. It should not be tied to the unique circumstances of its emergence.
The norm-taker / norm-maker hierarchy also informs Brosig and Zahringer's analysis of South Africa's engagement with R2P. They too draw on the work of Amitav Acharya and like Kenkel and de Rosa analysis of Brazil's relationship to R2P they find South Africa's approach is characterised by a similar pattern of contestation in the context of broader conformity. South Africa's recent history of course meant the post-apartheid regime was strongly committed to 'a human rights foreign policy', and its emergence as a regional power meant it has 'little option' but to engage international society on R2P. Yet also like Brazil, South Africa's foreign policy is influenced by the legacy of colonialism, and its opposition to 'structural inequality and the abuse of power in the global system' is at the core of its foreign policy. It is this that informed its apparent backtracking on the UN Security Council mandated intervention in Libya. The issue for South Africa was twofold: that the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)-led coalition saw 'regime change' as a proper outcome (even if it was not its intention); and those that disagreed with this judgment were seemingly unable to influence the powerful as they implemented the mandate. Where the first reflects a prudential bias toward dialogue with state authorities, the latter reflects a procedural concern about how to keep the powerful in check as they act on behalf of international society.
Neither of these necessarily rules out support for pillar III operations, but, as Brosig and Zahringer point out, it does reinforce the importance of accountability if R2P is to avoid reinforcing regressive hierarchies.
Special Responsibilities to Protect
Volkan Şeyşane and Çiğdem Çelik continue the focus on emerging powers with their analysis of R2P and Turkey's foreign policy. Indeed, their analysis reinforces the argument that engagement with R2P is considered a practice that helps constitute the 'emerging power' identity. Turkey is, however, something of a different case because of its geographic proximity to the Syria crisis. Turkey, one might argue, has a 'special responsibility to protect' by virtue of its geography, and indeed ŞeyşaneŞeyşane and Çelik argue that opening its border to refugees fleeing that crisis, Turkey is fulfilling that responsibility. 24 This is an important point and it reveals a blind spot in the analysis of R2P sceptics and optimists. The former's assessment of R2P's failings tends to overlook the fact that refugee populations are being protected. But then it would be wrong to see this as evidence that 'international society' is fulfilling its R2P. The vast majority of Syrian refugees are being protected by just five states:
Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and Egypt. To not acknowledge this fact risks reinforcing international hierarchies and the legitimacy concerns that go with them. with the more sanguine view about regime change, which the French, British and US displayed with respect to their intervention in Libya. Recent events in that country suggests the concerns of the emerging powers are well placed and not necessarily self-regarding.
Yet with respect to Turkey the picture is not this simple. While Turkey expressed reservations concerning regime change in Libya, Şeyşane and Çelik note that its stance on Syria is the complete opposite. It has joined those calling for the Assad regime to step aside.
This is an important reminder that the faultlines on how to implement R2P are not fixed;
states assess -and should assess -the merits of intervention on a case-by-case basis, which sometimes leads (as Gallagher notes) to legitimate inconsistency. It is perhaps fair to note, however, that some states are more pre-disposed to opposing regime change (if not Pillar III interventions) based on a particular view of the role the state plays in protecting human rights.
For their part, Şeyşane and Çelik criticise Turkey's commitment to regime change in Syria arguing that it is inconsistent with its responsibility to protect.
The argument that Turkey had a special responsibility to protect by virtue of its geographical proximity to the Syrian crisis is problematic. As noted, because the World Summit Outcome Document only codifies a general responsibility to protect, the distribution of the burdens of protection can be arbitrary and unfair. Geographical proximity make it obvious why Turkey and other states bordering Syria are best placed to protect refugee populations, but there are equally obvious reasons why these states cannot by themselves provide longer term protection. Without allocating a special responsibility to protect that is based on capability, as opposed to geographical proximity, R2P risks imposing burdens on states that are incapable of shouldering them. 26 The literature on R2P has two blind spots in this respect: a failure to see asylum as a means of fulfilling the responsibility to protect those fleeing R2P situations; and related to that, given that 80% of the world's refugees are protected by developing countries, the way in which the politics of protection potentially reinforces a hierarchy of states. By talking about the special responsibilities of the P5 on the Security Council, Justin Morris begins the process of what should be expected of the great powers. For Morris, R2P has added to, and complicated, the P5's special responsibility, which had previously been limited to maintaining international peace and security. This 'dual' special responsibility is allocated by virtue of their 'material abundance'; and, indeed, the P5's veto power is grounded on an understanding the great power consensus was necessary before international society could authorise the use of force. Without it, international action risked war between the great powers, which of course contradicted the Council's very purpose. This 'logic of 1945' pertains today Morris argues, which is why opposition to the idea that the P5 have a 'responsibility not to veto' (RN2V) in R2P situations should not be dismissed as irresponsible.
As Morris puts it, opponents of RN2V are making a normative point. Their position 'cannot … be understood in terms of the self-interested pleadings of the materially privileged'.
This strikes us as an important point. A cosmopolitan responsibility to protect does not -to use Alex Bellamy's phrase -'crowd out' other ethical considerations. 28 It can, and -if cosmopolitan progress is to be sustained -it must, be reconciled with the ethical concerns
Morris stresses, such as international peace and security. At the same time R2P's advocates often stress that military intervention is not the only way to protect the vulnerable. When military power is redundant it does not mean the P5 suddenly become incapable or that their special responsibilities somehow diminish. Their material capabilities -and indeed those of the aspirant permanent member states -surely demand that they seek other ways of reconciling their dual special responsibility.
This reinforces the need to consider asylum as a means of discharging the responsibility to protect. It can be reconciled with the responsibility to maintain international peace and security more easily than military intervention. As Brian Barbour and Brian Gorlick put it: '[t]here may be no easier way for the international community to meet its responsibility to protect than by providing asylum and other international protection on adequate terms'. 29 The point here is that the great powers are burdened by their special responsibility to Since writing these words, of course, the refugee situation in the Mediterranean region reached the crisis point and that has prompted the kind of reflection Welsh called for. 33 It is an open question as to whether asylum and refugee protection will feature more strongly in future R2P discourse. But as Hofmann tells us, the meaning of a norm is in constant process of iteration and reiteration, and this means such developments are not impossible.
As we look forward to the next ten years, there are possibly three key points to take from this special issue. The first is that advocates of R2P are right to mark the progress that has been made, but that should not -and generally does not -lead norm diffusers to rest on their laurels or to fall into a complacency that sees moral progress as inevitable. The Libya intervention was neither the success that its advocates claim, nor was it a nail in the coffin that R2P sceptics and critics are too quick to lower. But it was a warning that the consensus negotiated ten years ago can unravel if state practice becomes too conscious of the normmaker / norm-taker hierarchy and forgets the lessons of R2P's development, which is that states, especially emerging powers, more easily sign up to the principle if they can represent themselves as norm-shapers. The second point is that the burden of concrete protection practices -whether they be reflected in contributions to peacekeeping missions or the granting of asylum -is being unfairly distributed across international society. This hierarchy is also potentially destabilising and it demands that the great powers -or those laying claim to that identity -recognise their 'special responsibility to protect'. Finally, the great powers do have an important responsibility to reconcile the demands of human protection and international peace and security. It is difficult to reconcile these if we look narrowly at the former in terms of intervention, especially military intervention. However, R2P is indeterminate and that is its potential virtue. It encourages -or rather demands -creative diplomatic solutions to the moral dilemmas of a cosmopolitan international society.
Reiterating R2P reminds states that receiving refugees remains a prudent option when humanitarian intervention is not is an important step, especially in the current context.
